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INTRODUCTION 
Adolf Berle’s ideas have attained a remarkable longevity in corporate 
law with an influence exceeding that of any other twentieth century law 
professor.1 Participants in the now ten Berle symposia often have framed 
the discussion of his career as an intellectual history, usually built around 
the powerful transformative effect of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (MCPP).2 Yet this approach is insufficient to explain 
large parts of Berle’s professional career, including what Berle did during 
the twelve years of the Roosevelt Administration that immediately 
followed MCPP. This Article offers an alternative focus that better 
accounts for the career of an intellectual jobber, as Berle described 
himself. Intellectual history is still relevant—how could it not be when 
ideas were Berle’s stock in trade—but political history is at the forefront 
of this account, with particular attention to the interaction of Berle’s 
personal traits in this historical context, particularly his inclination to focus 
on one-off settings into which he could parachute and quickly exit. 
This opening section provides introductory observations as to: 
Berle’s biography before, during, and after the New Deal; the evolution of 
his writing during those periods; and the personal traits that shaped his 
entire professional life. Parts I and II focus on Berle during the Roosevelt 
Administration, the first five years based in New York City (but still an 
important participant in the President’s circle) and the last seven at the 
                                                     
 Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University. I am grateful to Bill 
Bratton, Daniel Ernst and Brad Snyder for sharing comments and sources about the New Deal and 
Berle and to Elizabeth Pollman for linking Berle the corporate academic to his writing on broader 
policy issues. Jeremy Goldstein and Sherry Yu provided helpful research on this project. 
 1. Some have gone further, such as the editors of the LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS who 
described Berle as “one of the most influential public policy intellectuals of the Twentieth Century.” 
See 4 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 36–37 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1975) 
[hereinafter BRANDEIS LETTERS]. 
 2. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (N.Y., Harcourt, Brace & World, rev. ed. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter MCPP]. 
664 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:663 
State Department (and immediately adjacent to the White House). Part III 
is a briefer treatment of his time after the New Deal. Each part develops 
an observation visible in each setting—Berle as a brain truster, intellectual 
jobber, and public intellectual. He was able to command most any topic 
on short notice and articulate a vision of a changed role for government in 
the economy, but less able to effectively implement policies reflecting 
those ideas. Part II.B takes a deep dive into the preparations of the 
American government during the time that Berle was at the State 
Department for a post-war international economic order, particularly 
planning for new international institutions in trade, monetary policy, and 
assembling global capital. This examination is valuable, independent of 
any discussion of Berle, for framing Brexit, Trump, and key current 
disagreements on the global economic stage, but it also helps understand 
Berle and his role during the New Deal. 
Berle was raised mostly in the Boston area, recognized as a child 
prodigy before entering Harvard College at age fourteen, followed by 
Harvard Law and a job at the Brandeis firm. World War I intervened, 
providing experiences that stimulated his life-long interests in Latin 
America and diplomacy, but even more significantly led him to turn away 
from his Boston and Harvard roots and make his way in New York City. 
There, his public commentary on foreign affairs, involvement in Native 
American issues in the West, and living in the Henry Street settlement 
gave way to a determined focus to reframe corporate law for a new era.3 
In 1932, his book with Gardiner Means, MCPP, set out the separation of 
ownership and control in the American corporation that shaped federal 
regulatory policy in corporate law for the remainder of the century.4 A 
contemporaneous exchange on the pages of the Harvard Law Review with 
Merrick Dodd framed a debate on the purpose of the corporation—for the 
benefit of shareholders or other stakeholders—that still anchors 
contemporary discussions of that topic.5 During that same year, as a 
                                                     
 3. Jordan Schwarz’s biography of Berle very effectively covers this and other parts of Berle’s 
life. See generally JORDAN SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN 
ERA (1987). For Berle’s focus on foreign affairs in his writing between 1919 and 1923, see the thirteen 
articles listed in that period in the bibliography, The Published Works of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1372, 1373 (1964) [hereinafter Published Works]. Between 1923 and 1931, Berle published 
fourteen law review articles on corporate law, mostly in the Harvard and Columbia Law Reviews. Id. 
 4. See generally MCPP, supra note 2. 
 5. See generally Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1145 (1932) and Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932), which were published respectively in the May and June 1932 issues of 
the Harvard Law Review after the Berle and Means book had been finished but before its publication 
and just as Berle began working on FDR’s campaign. Dodd’s piece had been a response to an earlier 
article by Berle published the prior year. See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Law as Powers in Trust, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). William Bratton and Michael Wachter have shown that the actual 1932 
exchange between Berle and Dodd does not have as much purchase for the contemporary 
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member of the brain trust for Franklin Roosevelt (and the speechwriter for 
the candidate’s important Commonwealth Club Speech during the fall 
campaign), Berle’s voice helped elect a President and bring in the New 
Deal with its massive changes in American government.6 For the thirty-
seven-year-old law professor, those three accomplishments in one year 
amounted to an intellectual trifecta. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Berle did not go into the new Administration 
after the election, as did other brain trusters. Rather, he went back to New 
York City to his law practice and teaching at Columbia and being a brain 
truster for Fiorello LaGuardia in the 1933 and 1937 mayoral campaigns. 
In between he served as Chamberlain for the city (the last Chamberlain 
before the job was abolished), all the while maintaining access to the 
President, taking on specific tasks for him, and regularly helping develop 
and explain economic policy.7 Berle joined the Roosevelt Administration 
full time in 1938 as Assistant Secretary of State, staying for the next seven 
years and then an additional year as U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. His 
portfolio still reflected his access to the President and presidential 
assignments, including some delicate matters related to intelligence and 
alleged communist infiltration. He was positioned to have a key role in 
planning the post-war international economic structure, which was 
ongoing from the time war broke out in Europe in mid-1939. This process 
led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization that provide the basis for contemporary 
international interaction in monetary affairs, development, and trade. One 
of the earliest meetings with John Maynard Keynes on the British side took 
place in Berle’s office, and he was a key link in discussions with the British 
about post-war economic matters.8 
After the war, with a new President and a new set of presidential 
advisers, Berle returned to New York City to teach at Columbia, work with 
foundations, and generally pursue the role of a public intellectual.9 Having 
essentially stopped publishing in law reviews10 and producing little in the 
                                                     
shareholder/stakeholder primacy discussions as modern writers may see. The two professors were on 
different wings of a then-current corporatist approach to corporate theory and each writer later changed 
his position in ways that blur where they would stand in the modern debate that invokes their names. 
See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist 
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008). 
 6. See William W. Bratton, The Modern Corporation and Private Property Revisited: Gardiner 
Means and the Administered Price, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 591 (2019) (discussing the Commonwealth 
Club speech and Berle’s role in the campaign). 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See Adolf A. Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 393 (1938). See 
generally Published Works, supra note 3. There were two law review articles in the 1933–1945 period: 
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way of books11 during the twelve years of the Roosevelt Administration, 
Berle again picked up his writing. Much of Berle’s law review writing of 
the post-war period returned to specific aspects of corporate law.12 The 
books picked up on the themes of MCPP but the corporatist threads of the 
earlier work had given way to what Bill Bratton has called a happier story 
where “big stick” government had emerged to keep corporations in line.13 
By the time of Berle’s death in 1971, this political economy approach had 
been challenged by competing ideologies, including what would become 
the market-based deregulatory corporate law theories that flowered during 
the 1980s.14 
The political history of the period enhances the understanding of the 
evolution of Berle’s career. In the 1920s he was still gathering ideas and 
data about structural changes in the corporate space in a post-industrial 
revolution economy. His focus was on building-out a new understanding 
of corporate finance in an economic environment where the Berle and 
Means corporation held center stage.15 Even so, most of his ideas for 
reform clustered around protecting shareholders against management 
overreaching, ideas that by themselves in the “normalcy” of the 1920s 
would not have commanded lasting attention. Yet, with the return of a 
progressive Democrat to the presidency, and the transformative expansion 
of the federal government in the wake of the unprecedented economic 
                                                     
one a five-page printing of his commencement remarks at Cornell Law School in 1938 and the other 
a fourteen-page, post-1934 follow-up of his 1931 article on liability for stock market manipulation. Id. 
 11. See Published Works, supra note 3. Between 1933 and 1945 he published a new edition of 
his casebook on corporate finance (with a co-author), a short French tract on man and property, a 
twenty-one-page book: ADOLF A BERLE, JR., NATIONAL REALISM AND CHRISTIAN FAITH (1940), and 
a book on liquidity, co-authored with a student, that addressed new forms of liquidity for property 
including particularly ownership of shares in modern corporations. Two books from this period related 
to his government service are addressed later in this Article: one a book based on his testimony to 
TNEC in 1939 regarding government providing of capital and the other his 1940 book, NEW 
DIRECTIONS AND THE NEW WORLD, based on a series of articles he had written about the state of world 
affairs. See infra note 63; SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 211 and accompanying text. 
 12. For example, a 1952 article on corporate personhood reflects some of the big picture ideas 
of the separation of ownership and control brought forward a couple of decades with analysis of links 
to contemporary debates on constitutional rights of corporations. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional 
Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic 
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952). Other articles address control theory in corporations and 
enterprise liability that seem to grow out of early Berle. See Published Works, supra note 3. 
 13. Bratton, supra note 6. Bratton discusses Means’s focus on administering prices—in Means’s 
dissertation but omitted from MCPP, yet essential to understanding the ideas in the book. 
 14. A conference held at Stanford in 1982 on the 50th Anniversary of the publication of MCPP 
represents the new movement’s challenge to Berle and Means. See Conference, Corporations and 
Private Property, 26 J. L. ECON. 235 (1983). Bill Bratton’s contribution in this symposium discusses 
Means’s participation in that conference and the newcomers’ challenge to the Berle and Means thesis 
evidenced at that conference. 
 15. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of the Berle–Means Corporation, 42 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 445 (2019). 
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calamity of the Great Depression and then world war, there was room for 
new approaches. The New Deal essentially added one new financial statute 
per year until the outbreak of World War II that cumulatively sought to 
bring more social control over finance.16 Berle’s explanations provided 
fertile ground to support the growth of such broad change.17 During this 
time, Berle was in (or within sight of) the mainstream of political 
developments. Thereafter, politics became too wide and too deep; his 
sallies into the larger political space were briefer and fewer and he spent 
more time in the protected coves of foundations and the university.18 
Berle’s personal traits certainly shaped his political role and he surely 
benefited from another political development of the period—changes in 
the staffing of the presidency and the executive branch that made room for 
the brain truster role he most valued. He served such a function for David 
Lilienthal in Wisconsin before FDR and for LaGuardia in New York City 
afterwards.19 The term, however, does not necessarily suggest a precise 
definition. For Berle, it meant a freelancer as to ideas and a free agent. As 
he described himself in a letter after the election in 1932, “I shall choose 
merely . . . being an intellectual jobber and contractor from time to time 
when jobs come forward.”20 This was “to have in life the thing that he most 
wants.”21 The “free” part seems to have been key. Full of ideas, he believed 
                                                     
 16. This legislation included the following: Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 
74; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881; Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803; 1938 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 (the Chandler Act), Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840; 1938 Amendments to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Maloney Act), Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070; Trust Indenture Act of 
1939, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881; Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 
Stat. 789; Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847. 
 17. There is something of a disconnect between Berle’s early corporate law writings from the 
1920s and his responses to the Depression. Both are contained in MCPP and the relationship is 
sometimes hard to reconcile. William Bratton and Michael Wachter, in a series of articles singly and 
together, have provided a helpful typology identifying “early”, “middle”, and “late” Berle. Both early 
and middle Berle are interspersed in MCPP—a disconcerting result—but one that reflects the changing 
political trends in the wake of the economic calamity at the end of the 1920s. See Bratton & Wachter, 
supra note 5, at 121. 
 18. This analogy derives from an insight of Dan Ernst. 
 19. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 72. 
 20. Letter from August A. Berle to John Hanna, Columbia Law Professor (Nov. 16, 1932), in 
NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS 1918-1971, at 80–81 (Beatrice B. Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973) 
(“[S]hort of some particular set of circumstances imposing a real obligation, I should be merely foolish 
to trade this for the mazes of official life in Washington.”). For Berle’s use of this “intellectual jobber” 
term in a different context, see Harwell Wells,“All Lawyers are Somewhat Suspect”: Adolf A. Berle 
and the Modern Legal Profession, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 641 (2019). 
 21. Letter from August A. Berle to John Hanna, in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 
81. 
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he could take on a wide range of issues and then was on to the next 
challenge, often without the need to stay long on a particular topic.22 
At the same time, other personal traits limited his effectiveness in the 
roles he undertook after 1932. He was unquestionably smart. He believed 
he could do almost anything: solve the sugar problem in the Dominican 
Republic; become a Russian expert simply by stepping behind a desk at 
an Army hall in World War I; join in the heady days of peace talks with 
little more than university degrees.23 Two other qualities, however, limited 
his effectiveness. First, he regularly preferred one-off tasks, serving as the 
intellectual jobber and free-lancer that he described in his 1932 
explanation as to why he would go back to New York City. 
Implementation of policy did not hold nearly the attraction for him that 
ideas or solving a particular problem did. Even when he went to the State 
Department (in 1938 and again in 1961 as discussed below), he thought he 
could do what needed to be done in six months and then be on to something 
else. The semester-long period of a professor’s typical class may have 
been his optimal time target. Second and probably a side effect of the first 
quality, it was a challenge for him to work as part of a team. As a New 
York newspaper columnist concluded, when Berle went to Washington, 
“the widespread conviction that Berle is just as good as he says doesn’t 
make him any easier to take.”24 Co-workers found him a challenge, not 
just for his ego and vanity but also for his impact on team production. “He 
works in every direction, with or without instructions,” one colleague said; 
“Berle’s sphere of activity is still more or less of an enigma.”25 His 
strengths that stood out in drafting speeches for the President or presenting 
the structure of an academic article worked less well in a two- or three-
year process to build out a detailed system of post-war international 
economic agencies. Berle’s quick mind didn’t give him the detailed 
                                                     
 22. His biographer, Jordan Schwarz, includes an example of how Berle “acquired expertise 
quickly” as “a clever man bent upon capturing the ears of men in power.” See SCHWARZ, supra note 
3, at 23–24. As Berle told the story in an oral history at Columbia Law School in 1969, he was at the 
Army War College near the end of World War I awaiting reassignment after service in the Dominican 
Republic. The officer at the desk where Berle was standing received orders for Siberia and 
immediately left the building. Berle assumed the position behind the desk and was confronted by an 
orderly with a colonel’s request for the current exchange rate of Finnish marks. Berle retrieved a 
newspaper from the trash, answered the colonel’s question, and soon received several additional 
queries which Berle answered. When the colonel subsequently appeared to see who had been 
answering his questions, he made Berle his “expert” on Russian economics. See Transcript of Oral 
History Interview: Reminiscences of Adolf A. Berle, Jr.: Oral History 32–34 (1969) (on file at the 
Oral Research Office of Columbia University) [hereinafter Reminiscences]. 
 23. See supra infra Parts I–II; sources cited note 22. 
 24. Rodney Dutcher, In Washington, TELEGRAPH-HERALD, Feb. 16, 1938, at 6. 
 25. Diary of Breckenridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State 233 (Dec. 20, 1940) (on file with 
author). 
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knowledge of monetary control and trade restrictions that the international 
process needed. 
I. INFLUENCING THE NEW DEAL FROM NEW YORK CITY, 1933–1937 
After the election in 1932, other prominent members of the brain 
trust entered the Administration—Raymond Moley as Assistant Secretary 
of State, for example, and Rexford Tugwell as Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture. Berle continued to be based in New York, teaching law at 
Columbia and practicing law with his brother.26 
That did not keep him from regular tasks for the President. During 
the period between the election and inauguration (then a four-month 
period, six weeks longer than the current transition), Berle worked on 
railroad reorganization, sparking a disagreement with another FDR 
advisor from academia, Felix Frankfurter, his former professor.27 Berle 
was willing to acknowledge the reality of size in the modern economy and 
have government regulate big corporations while Frankfurter’s approach 
was aligned with the Brandeisian model of breaking up large entities to 
enhance competition among small participants.28 Right after the 
inauguration, Roosevelt designated Berle and others to meet at Treasury 
with the Federal Reserve, private bankers, and others on the banking crisis. 
Berle was named secretary of a subgroup of five to develop a specific 
scheme for Congress.29 Over the first six months of the new 
Administration, he commuted from New York as a special assistant on 
railroad matters to Jesse Jones, chair of the Reconstruction Finance 
                                                     
 26. Berle also served on the advisory board of the New York Stock Exchange during his time in 
New York, among other activities. 
 27. See Diary of Raymond Moley (Jan. 11, 1933) (on file with Raymond Moley Papers, Box 1) 
(noting Berle’s conversation with Moley including Berle expressing the view that Frankfurter was out 
to ruin him). In a letter to FDR about Frankfurter’s intervention, Berle signed the letter: “Yours truly, 
in a mean state of mind, with considerable admiration for F.F’s public career and an intense personal 
desire to see him shot.” Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt, in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 
supra note 20, at 83. The Berle–Frankfurter relationship, seemingly, was never good. Frankfurter had 
joined the Harvard law faculty during Berle’s second year as a law student. See Roscoe Pound, 
Frankfurter at Harvard, in FRANKFURTER, A TRIBUTE 137 (Wallace Mendelsohn ed., 1964). Joseph 
P. Lash, in a biographical essay accompanying the Diary of Felix Frankfurter, suggested, “There was 
always an edge to Berle’s opposition, a touch of resentment, at having been excluded from 
Frankfurter’s little elite group of disciples at Harvard Law School.” Joseph B. Lash, Biographical 
Essay, in FROM THE DIARY OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 44 (Joseph P. Lash ed. 1975). Jordan Schwarz 
suggested the student had given offense to the somewhat older professor: “Their ambition seemed to 
need each other’s enmity.” SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 15. 
 28. See Telegram from Frankfurter to Raymond Moley (Jan. 12, 1933) (on file with Raymond 
Moley Papers, Box 68) (“[I] am greatly disturbed after talking with Berle lest governor be 
embarrassingly involved in support of railroad reorganization bill . . . .”). A reorganization bill passed 
on the last day of the Hoover Administration. This disagreement between Berle and Frankfurter 
reappeared at various points in the future. 
 29. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 86. 
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Corporation. He resigned that position September 1 when Roosevelt sent 
him with Sumner Welles (later the Undersecretary of State who brought 
Berle to the State Department) on a special mission to Havana to deal with 
Cuban instability.30 
Throughout this early period, Berle was central in developing core 
economic ideas of the New Deal. He shared with other brain trusters, 
Moley and Tugwell, a faith in more state planning for the economy. Early 
on this was evidenced in the corporatist planning approach of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act that was passed in the first hundred days of the 
New Deal providing space for corporations collectively to decide on rules 
for competition.31 This centerpiece of the early New Deal industrial policy 
empowered the National Recovery Administration to oversee broad 
industry agreement on prices and other matters, but ultimately proved 
unsuccessful in practice even before it was struck down by the Supreme 
Court in 1935.32 During FDR’s second term, as the economic malaise 
continued, Berle embraced the Keynesian idea of government spending to 
stimulate the economy. Throughout the first two terms, Berle advocated 
for multiple means to provide more state capital, a view shared by Jesse 
Jones, whose Reconstruction Finance Corporation financed multiple New 
Deal programs. Berle looked to others with similar ideas including, for 
example, Robert Moses, whose planning for New York City was just 
beginning to takes shape when Berle was Chamberlain, and Hjalmar 
Schacht, the finance chief of the Third Reich until 1937.33 The idea of 
using government capital to enhance the growth of private corporations 
was an idea that Berle shared with John Maynard Keynes even before the 
specific interactions between the two discussed in Part II. 
These tasks and the ideas Berle wrote about provided him a seat at 
the table but did not make him a major actor in FDR’s now famous first 
hundred days. Berle had a public role in the debate around each of the 
economic ideas just discussed, although (equally as telling) he had no 
significant role in drafting any of the statutes of 1933 or thereafter or in 
organizing the agencies that were created to administer the burgeoning 
administrative state, other than a brief stint at the RFC in 1933. 
                                                     
 30. Id. at 82, 90–91. 
 31. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
 32. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See generally ELLIS 
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 28 (1995). See also id. at 460–61 
(describing an early version of the planning orientation—versus competition enhancing or spending—
as set forth by Berle in a widely publicized memorandum in July 1938 discussing the lines of inquiry 
that TNEC might pursue, in which Berle argued TNEC should not assume that all monopoly was bad, 
that cartels were necessarily harmful, that small business was necessarily competitive or necessarily 
humane, or that big business necessarily grew by predatory tactics, and it should realize that there 
were immense practical difficulties in the way of applying the theory of an “elastic price”). 
 33. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 119. 
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For example, in the drafting of the Securities Act of 1933, Roosevelt 
had instructed two different groups to prepare drafts in the period after his 
election in 1932.34 After the resulting legislation ran into difficulty when 
it got to Congress soon after the inauguration, the President quickly moved 
to a third group (Felix Frankfurter et al.) who quickly came to Washington 
for a weekend drafting session that produced the legislation that eventually 
passed Congress in the first hundred days.35 Berle, over that winter, had 
received a grant from the Commonwealth Fund for a project on state 
securities laws and would have been as well situated substantively as 
Frankfurter to take on the task.36 Berle later told William O. Douglas, his 
former colleague on the Columbia faculty, “I have always felt unhappy 
that our good friend, Felix Frankfurter, who knows next to nothing about 
the subject except on paper, felt that he had reached the final and 
everlasting answer.”37 
Berle had more interest in a federal incorporation bill that would have 
enacted a federal law of corporations, having drafted a bill for a House 
committee during the transition.38 A year later he wrote to Douglas, then a 
law professor but soon to be SEC chair and later a Supreme Court justice: 
“Confidentially, we are working on a federal incorporation law, which I 
hope will be presented to Congress in the next session.”39 Implementation 
is often more difficult than proposing; this idea failed to make it into the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any federal legislation since. 
Frankfurter, who was in England on leave from the Harvard law faculty, 
had a greater role in the drafting of the 1934 Act than Berle. Similarly, the 
breakup of public utilities and various new regulatory regimes for 
investment advisers, mutual funds and broker–dealers all went forward 
without Berle.40 
Berle’s access to Roosevelt did provide him with a recurring role in 
policy discussions including, for example, those between Supreme Court 
Justice Louis Brandeis and Roosevelt. Berle’s connections with Brandeis 
                                                     
 34. One version came from the work of Samuel Untermyer who had a prominent role in hearings 
during what had been the most recent Democratic Administration and the other by Huston Thompson, 
a former chair of the Federal Trade Commission. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF 
THE NEW DEAL 1933-1935, at 440 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1958). 
 35. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 82. 
 36. Minutes of Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund (Oct. 22, 1932). 
 37. Letter from Adolf A. Berle to William O. Douglas (Dec. 30, 1933) (on file with author). 
 38. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 82. 
 39. Id. 
 40. This is not to say that Berle did not offer ideas. See Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Benjamin 
Cohen (Dec. 8, 1934) (on file with Records of the Department of the Interior, Record Group 49, Box 
9, National Public Power Committee (Entry 907)) (enclosing “miscellaneous remarks on the general 
subject of holding companies”); see also Letters to Felix Frankfurter from Secretary of the Treasury 
William Woodin and Representative Sam Rayburn concerning the Securities Act of 1933, in 
NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 86–87. 
672 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:663 
dated back to his youth. Adolf A. Berle Sr. was a Congregationalist 
minister in Boston and aligned with Brandeis in progressive causes.41 The 
elder Berle provided written testimony for Brandeis during his highly 
contested four-month confirmation process in 1916 that made him the first 
Jewish justice on the Supreme Court.42 Berle’s first job after graduating 
from Harvard Law School that same year (a connection in which his father 
assisted) had been at the Brandeis firm, where he practiced for a year 
before joining the army when the United States entered World War I.43 
Even so, there was a large gulf between how Berle and Brandeis viewed 
the best response to incorporated enterprises that had come to dominate 
the economy since the Civil War. Brandeis long favored breaking up the 
big entities through antitrust and otherwise while Berle recognized the 
seeming inevitability of the corporate form and sought ways to combat 
them, particularly via government controls. This approach was part of the 
corporatist approach described earlier. Berle did not confront Brandeis on 
these differences, but neither did he accede to the justice’s preferred 
economic solution.44 
The New Deal’s legislative agenda faced intense headwinds from the 
Supreme Court during Roosevelt’s first term, and Roosevelt had no 
opportunity to make an appointment to the Court until August 1937.45 At 
times, Roosevelt could not even count on the support of Brandeis, 
Benjamin Cardozo, or former Columbia Law dean Harlan Fiske Stone. In 
                                                     
 41. The Brandeis Letters contain several letters of Brandeis to the elder Berle and other 
references to common causes. See 2 BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 1, at 91 (Feb. 26, 1908), 152 
(Sept. 27, 1906), 161 (May 20, 1908). See generally MCCP, supra note 2. 
 42. See S. REP. NO. 66-409, at 294–95 (1916) (containing letter of Adolf A. Berle of February 
18, 1916: “many of the interests represented by the protesting gentlemen are now and have been ever 
since I have resided in the Commonwealth, against any emergence into public influence and power of 
anyone not of their number and clan. . . . [Brandeis] would adorn the bench and add to the glory . . . of 
the greatest court in the world”). 
 43. Berle’s oral history at Columbia describes the elder Berle’s reaching out to Brandeis after 
the younger Berle saw a notice of a job opening at the Brandeis firm. See Reminiscences, supra note 
22, at 18. The Brandeis Letters contain a letter from Brandeis to the elder Berle responding to Berle 
Sr.’s letters of January 24, 1906 and January 30, 1906 regarding Berle Jr. and congratulating Brandeis 
(after the announcement by President Wilson of his nomination of Brandeis to the court). The Brandeis 
response on February 9, 1916 said, “It is a great pleasure to have your letter[s] of the 24th and 30th as 
it was recently to meet your son and to be reminded of our more frequent meetings years ago.” 
4 BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 1, at 36. 
 44. Berle wrote to Justice Brandeis in 1923 seeking advice on whether he should take on a 
particular client, but the exchange probably indicates the lack of mentors Berle had at the time more 
than particular closeness between the two. See 5 BRANDEIS LETTERS, supra note 1, at 101 (Sept. 28, 
1923). 
 45. After a continuing string of non-success before the Court into 1936, Roosevelt launched his 
Court Packing Plan in the winter after the election that year. The plan was rejected by the Senate in 
mid-1937, but within a month Roosevelt made his first appointment to the Court with six more 
following over the next four years. See also A. C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law 
and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2008). 
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the spring of 1934, Brandeis told Jerome Frank that he wanted to see Berle 
and Tugwell; after meeting with the justice, Berle reported to the President 
of Brandeis’s concerns about New Deal Programs.46 During that summer, 
Brandeis summoned Berle to his vacation home on Cape Cod to again 
express worry about an approach allowing concentration in the economy 
and the merits of an Administration response centered on balancing such 
concentration with government power as opposed to decentralizing.47 In 
September, at Roosevelt’s invitation, Berle participated in a discussion 
including the President, SEC chair Joseph Kennedy, and a railroad 
president at Hyde Park about the Administration’s approach to 
concentration in the economy.48 
During this time, when not performing tasks for the President, Berle 
was actively engaged with Fiorello LaGuardia’s campaign to become 
mayor of New York, an election that took place in November of 1933.49 
Arguing on behalf of the reforming Republican against a weak Tammany 
incumbent and an anti-Tammany Democrat whom FDR could have 
backed, Berle played a key role in keeping the President neutral.50 
LaGuardia won the election with a plurality of the vote and offered Berle 
the job of chamberlain of the City where he could take on the task of 
coordinating the response to the city’s financial crisis. The position was 
made for a brain truster. Berle biographer Jordan Schwarz described it as 
providing the “opportunity to delve into anything he and LaGuardia 
considered fair game.”51 Berle described the job as permitting him “to 
cover a good deal of general brain trusting for the Administration on a 
wide variety of subjects including elevator strikes, transit unification, the 
                                                     
 46. Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt (Apr. 23, 1934), in NAVIGATING THE 
RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 95 (“Mr. Justice Brandeis has been revolving matters in his head and I think 
requires some attention.”). Berle’s letter opened with the greeting “Dear Caesar,” a salutation Berle 
was prone to use until Roosevelt sent word in the heat of the court-packing dispute to desist. See Berle 
Diary (Mar. 4, 1937), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 125. 
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message from Brandeis to Roosevelt. After the Schechter decision in 1935, Brandeis told Corcoran 
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 48. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 106. 
 49. See GEORGE WHITNEY MARTIN, CCB: THE LIFE AND CENTURY OF CHARLES C. 
BURLINGHAM, NEW YORK’S FIRST CITIZEN, 1858-1959, at 339–40 (2005) (describing Berle in a group 
of four reform leaders that helped LaGuardia to power). 
 50. See Letters from Adolf A. Berle to Arthur Mann (Mar. 31, 1965 & Apr. 21, 1965), in 
NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 89 (“Roosevelt considered he had a half-commitment to 
support [Democratic candidate Joseph] McKee . . . . I like to think I neutralized his influence . . . . 
Roosevelt said nothing—and stayed out.”). 
 51. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 96. 
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rehabilitation of the credit of the City of New York, salvaging the real 
estate mortgage bond situation, and so forth.”52 
II. MOVING INSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION: 
 THE STATE DEPARTMENT, 1938–1944 
A. Initial Expectations 
There were recurring efforts to get Berle to Washington. 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles pushed during 1937 for Berle to 
join the State Department.53 He had the good sense to make the pitch to 
Berle as a position that would permit double brain trusting, for both the 
President and the State Department.54 What evolved was a mix of 
economics, diplomacy, and politics that appealed to Berle’s free 
agent/intellectual jobber approach to life. 
The Great Depression hung on despite New Deal efforts (including 
a second new deal in 1935–1936) and the economy took another dip in the 
fall of 1937 through most of 1938. After LaGuardia’s reelection and with 
the economy suffering, Berle was among eight men—industrialists, union 
leaders, and brain trusters—who gathered at the Century Club in New 
York in December 1937 to debate possible changes in the 
Administration’s economic policies. Most of the group then met with the 
President early in the new year pushing broader federal spending, although 
the effort failed to gain much traction.55 
As Berle began work at the State Department after he was confirmed 
by the Senate on March 4, 1938, he continued to be active in formulating 
economic policy. In 1939, for example, he testified before the Temporary 
National Economic Committee, a joint group of members of both houses 
of Congress and cabinet/agency representatives, on proposals for access to 
capital; he suggested, for example, a bank where government agencies 
could go for public works or congressional creation of a capital credit bank 
for public or private enterprises in need of financing not available via 
private lending—all ideas consistent with the state-provision of capital 
that was a familiar Berle theme.56 
Similarly, Berle continued to be active in politics during his time at 
the State Department. For example, he made a trip to Colorado to speak to 
Democrats in August of 1939 and to Texas in February of the following 
                                                     
 52. SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 97. 
 53. Berle Diary (Apr. 29, 1937), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 126. 
 54. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 110. 
 55. NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, at 154–57, 159–60. 
 56. Ernest K. Lindley, The Capital Bank, Mr. Berle’s New Idea, WASH. POST, May 28, 1939, 
at 9. 
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year.57 Of course, his day job was in the Department entrusted with 
American foreign affairs and he had been hooked on diplomacy since his 
World War I experience. After joining the Army when America joined the 
war, Berle was sent to the Dominican Republic to secure legal title to 
Dominican sugar for United States interests, an experience that 
engendered a lifelong interest in Latin America and in foreign affairs.58 
Berle’s experience in Paris, when the Army rushed him and many others 
for the sudden arrival of peace negotiations in 1918, impressed upon him 
(and many others in the American government) the need to plan for peace 
in an entirely different way when faced with another world war. Prior to 
his State Department tenure, Berle had been an American commissioner 
to the 1936 Buenos Aires conference on peace in the hemisphere, also 
attended by the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.59 The 
conference, which reflected the Administration’s Good Neighbor policy, 
sought to create a tighter bond between the U.S. and the Americas at a time 
of darkening clouds internationally. Berle’s continuing interest in Latin 
America and his resistance to British trade restrictions and its imperialistic 
desires could be seen in this period and later when he got to the State 
Department. 
But even the diplomatic tasks he undertook once he joined the 
Administration as Assistant Secretary—a trip to Lima for an Inter-
American Conference in 1938, negotiating a deal with Canada regarding 
the St. Lawrence Seaway, speechwriting after the Munich Conference—
had a strong flavor of one-off tasks of a freelancer.60 A British foreign 
office reported, “Neither I nor anyone else I know of, has any idea of why 
Mr. Berle was appointed or what he did in office . . . . [H]e has told me 
that he was engaged in economic work, and was attending to no routine 
matters at all.”61 
Consistent with that approach, Berle did not see himself staying long 
at the State Department—perhaps six months in his original conception. 
As that period was running out, and after he had submitted a resignation 
                                                     
 57. See infra notes 81, 86 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Reminiscences, supra note 22, at 5. 
 59. See Beatrice Bishop Berle Diary (Dec. 2, 1936), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 20, 
at 119. 
 60. See SCHWARZ, supra note 3, at 123–28, 147–55. 
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“New Deal”, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1975, at 35.  
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letter to the President, he got caught up in the Czechoslovakian crisis.62 He 
helped advise Secretary of State Hull and write the President’s speech after 
the Munich agreement and his resignation was delayed.63 After going to 
Lima as a commissioner to the Inter-American conference in December 
1938, he took a leave of absence for six weeks or so to ponder approaches 
before returning to daily work at the Department. During 1940, Berle again 
expressed his expectation to return to New York after the election.64 
Over this period of his early time at the State Department, three 
developments reset his decision space, extended his tenure, and changed 
the focus of his work. The most dramatic change, of course, was the 
outbreak of war in Europe in mid-1939 and the fall of country after country 
in the spring of 1940, leaving the United Kingdom seemingly isolated 
against the Axis.65 But it was not just a change in world events; there were 
unexpected political changes afoot in domestic politics as a possible third 
term for Franklin Roosevelt was broached and moved to reality. After his 
trip to Colorado in August of 1939, Berle reported to Roosevelt that 
Democrats there saw the choices as a third term or Hull.66 Before going to 
speak to Texas Democrats in February of 1940, Berle went to see the 
President, so as to be warned off of any incorrect messages in the 
anticipated speech. Berle then told the Texans, “I do not think the 
President wants a third term” but would accept a draft.67 Three weeks 
before the election he was summoned to the White House for campaign 
speech-writing duties: “It was the old Brain Trust back again, except the 
scene was the Cabinet Room instead of the Hotel Roosevelt.”68 Berle was 
to serve the third term in D.C. but his focus changed. Economics was still 
a key topic, but world events made it more international than domestic and 
more focused on structuring a new approach to international economic 
relations. 
                                                     
 62. See Letter from Adolf A. Berle to Franklin Roosevelt (Aug. 16, 1938), in NAVIGATING THE 
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B. Designing the Post-War Economic Structure for the World 
With the outbreak of war in Europe and the increasing likelihood of 
a third term for Roosevelt, Berle’s time horizon for his tenure in 
government lengthened and the pursuit of a new international economic 
structure occupied a large and continuing place in his work. This Part first 
outlines the general approach that Berle and other New Dealers had in 
addressing these problems, the evolving understanding of economics in 
the world order, and the competition between different parts of the 
Administration to plan this structure. Subsequent Parts outline the 
evolution of this planning and Berle’s role in it focusing on the 
distinctively different tenor of the early part of this period from the later 
part. 
1. Laying Down a Marker: This Time Would Be Different 
Berle, Roosevelt, and other New Dealers who had seen the peace 
process after World War I up close approached their task in a new war 
resolved that it would be different for them; the time for making peace was 
during the war, not after it. Berle had initially served in the Dominican 
Republic in World War I, as discussed above. He arrived back in 
Washington for a new assignment just as the war ended and a mad 
scramble began to negotiate the peace.69 He was among a large number of 
army officers dispatched to Paris, talking his way into a room at the main 
hotel, joining a group of then-youthful officers who would go on to high 
positions in American government—John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, 
William Bullitt; Berle, with Bullitt and others were the “jeunesse 
radicales” who had protested the penal nature of the peace that constricted 
post-war development.70 
Franklin Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, formed his 
own perception of the process that shaped his own approach as President.71 
Berle and Roosevelt had conversations on these issues going back to the 
1932 campaign.72 John Maynard Keynes, to become a key player on the 
                                                     
 69. Reminiscences, supra note 22, at 32–34. 
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British side in the negotiations to come, had argued in the earlier period 
for American wealth to bankroll the reconstruction of Europe.73 He was 
not successful in blocking a penal peace coming out of the Versailles 
conference, but his book on the deficiencies of the peace process increased 
his stature.74 His challenge to the neoclassical paradigm as to 
government’s role in priming the economy from his 1936 book, The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, influenced New Deal 
efforts on spending in 1938 and thereafter. From mid-1940, he was a key 
figure for the Treasury on the British side in the process described in the 
following section. 
Berle continued to have a highly visible profile. His 1940 book, New 
Directions in the New World, written in part during his State Department 
sabbatical, supported a post-war economic system in which American 
wealth would play a role similar to what Keynes had suggested for the post 
World War I period.75 Another book that year, by Joseph Alsop and Robert 
Kintner, relied on Berle’s unpublished diaries in examining American 
diplomacy after the Munich crisis, suggesting America could be drawn 
into war.76 
In 1941 Berle was active in several important pre-war issues for the 
American President. Early in that year, a fight between State and Treasury 
on freezing foreign assets while America was still neutral went to the 
White House where Roosevelt upheld Berle and the State Department’s 
view against such action.77 Berle also played a key role in early 1941 in 
securing Canadian acquiescence to an agreement for the St. Lawrence 
Seaway. During talks in Ottawa, where Berle initialed the agreement for 
the United States, Berle seemed to build Canadian interest for more 
integrated defense and economic planning involving the two neighbors. 
Later that spring in a meeting at Roosevelt’s home at Hyde Park, the 
Canadian prime minister secured Roosevelt’s assent for American lend-
lease to, in effect, subsidize U.K. purchases from Canada, a concession 
that seemed to dull the Canadian interest in Berle’s larger plans for 
integrated government planning.78 
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2. The Substance to Be Covered by the Economic Plan:  
Trade, Monetary Issues, and Development 
While the key players agreed on the value of planning, it took longer 
to identify what they wanted to plan and longer still to arrive at an 
agreement on the plan. Twenty-first century commentators regularly look 
back to the economic changes in the international order resulting from 
World War II and focus on three international institutions—the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organization (and its predecessors)—created at Bretton Woods in 1944 
and in other international conferences of the period. Indeed, the planning 
from the very beginning of the war focused on the three overlapping sets 
of international economic issues associated with these organizations: 
monetary policy, capital for development, and trade. Plummeting 
international trade after the stock market crash and increased tariffs of the 
period cut wealth across borders. Currency manipulation and continuing 
challenges from efforts to return to the gold standard in many countries 
fueled economic unrest. Insufficient capital was available for stabilization 
and development, a challenge made so much greater by war. Problems in 
each exacerbated worries in the other two. 
The text for international agreements had only been completed for 
the IMF and World Bank when the delegates gathered at Bretton Woods 
in New Hampshire in the summer of 1944, but Roosevelt’s message to the 
delegates was clear as to the integral role of trade in the overall approach 
to international economic relations. He noted that the program to be 
discussed at Bretton Woods  
concerns the basis on which [ordinary men and women] will be able 
to exchange with one another the natural riches of the earth and the 
products of their own industry and ingenuity. Commerce is the life 
blood of a free society. We must see to it that the arteries which carry 
that blood stream are not clogged again, as they have been in the past, 
by artificial barriers created through senseless economic rivalries.79  
The post-war path of the trade portion of this agenda is beyond the scope 
of this Article except to say that that path illustrates the interconnectedness 
of the various parts of international economic law that the Berle-era 
drafters saw clearly, the enduring centrality of the questions that were the 
focus of the initial planning, and the continuing relevance of that period to 
contemporary debates.80 
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Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Berle’s boss, had long dreamt of 
structural response to the tariffs that had grown substantially in response 
to the Great Depression and to the disruptions of war that had undercut 
trade.81 American planners saw the importance of trade to produce 
employment at home and how opening trade for undeveloped countries 
could increase the standard of living around the globe. Trade traditionally 
held out the lure of comparative advantage. One country (or producer) 
could focus more on products in which it had a relative advantage (e.g., 
natural resources available to it, more than to other producers) and could 
trade those products for other products which were not as available within 
its borders, but more so in some other country. Tariffs could distort this 
exchange as countries sought to protect their domestic producers and gain 
a greater share of market exchanges. This, in turn, caused countervailing 
tariffs and other acts by other countries and the decline of international 
trade. 
International trade, even with no tariffs, is unlikely to leave any 
country with an exact match of its exports and imports, such that there will 
be a need for an adjustment mechanism for the currency received in 
exchange of the goods. The gold standard provided a long-used, if 
imperfect, mechanism for such adjustments. The national currency of a 
country that regularly imported more than it exported may well see the 
value of its currency (relative to gold) become less valuable and take steps 
to bring its imports and exports back into line. But such change in the 
exchange rate could lead to inflation or deflation of the country’s currency 
that would impact the health of the domestic economy in ways that the 
government may wish to encourage or avoid. Thus, there would be a 
temptation for a country to manipulate the exchange rate, for example to 
make its goods cheaper and the goods from other countries more 
expensive. German, Japanese, and even British currency manipulation 
during the 1930s illustrated such distortions to the economic status quo.82 
Our own times provide current examples of fears of currency manipulation 
and imbalances in trade and efforts and a need for international agreements 
to prevent crises that have led to currency wars in the past. The gold 
standard had another disadvantageous effect in that the natural scarcity of 
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the mineral and its somewhat random distribution about the globe made it 
difficult for governments to quickly provide the liquidity necessary in 
periodic panics that gripped economies.83 
Finally, the destruction of war across the globe greatly exacerbated 
the capital needs generated by years of economic depression. The 
likelihood of private capital sufficient to meet such needs seemed remote; 
the ability of many individual countries to generate sufficient capital 
internally called for an international response. 
Planners seeking to put the post-war economy on firmer footing, 
particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, saw all three of 
these challenges—trade, monetary and capital for redevelopment—as 
requiring an international structure beyond that which then existed. As the 
planning process evolved, initial attention was given first to the monetary 
challenge with separate plans being developed each by American and 
British teams. The capital needs of reconstruction were coupled with these 
negotiations, often as a junior partner until the second week of Bretton 
Woods when discussion about the World Bank took center stage.84 Trade 
negotiations ended up on a different track, taking somewhat longer to 
complete. That description, however, blurs a much more nuanced 
development that merits additional attention, both for what it tells us about 
Adolf Berle, and for better understanding where we are today on these 
same questions. 
3. A Rumble Along Pennsylvania Avenue: Competition Among 
Agencies of the American Government in Responding  
to Post-War Planning 
Richard Gardner in his classic book on the period, Sterling Dollar 
Diplomacy, observes that, “by the time the United States entered the 
Second World War, its great executive departments were engaged in a 
major struggle over their respective responsibilities for the planning of 
post-war foreign economic policy.”85 The topic naturally linked to both 
foreign affairs and financial policy so both State and Treasury could claim 
a natural interest. Roosevelt was known to not rely on fixed lines of 
authority and preferred to let his advisers and agencies fight it out, as in 
                                                     
 83. See MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 162 (2017) (discussing the importance of central bank responsibility of two key 
aspects of the management of money in a capitalistic economy: “to ensure that in good times the 
amount of money grows at a sufficient rate to maintain broad stability in the value of money” and “to 
ensure that in bad times the amount of money grows at a rate sufficient to provide the 
liquidity . . . required to meet unpredictable swings in the demand for it by the private sector. . . . These 
two functions are rather simple to state, if hard to carry out.”). 
 84. CONWAY, supra note 82, at 237. 
 85. GARDNER, supra note 81, at 71–72. 
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the drafting of the federal securities act described above. The early 
planning for a post-war economic structure followed a similar path of 
shared effort. Roosevelt wanted both State and Treasury involved and also 
the Board of Economic Warfare, which at the relevant time was run by 
Vice President Henry Wallace, a possible candidate to be Roosevelt’s 
successor.86 
State and Treasury, the bigger institutional and political players, were 
situated along Pennsylvania Avenue on either side of the White House.87 
Hull occupied the senior cabinet seat and had a political role to match, 
based on his previous time in the Senate and House and his regular 
mention as a possible successor to Roosevelt. At Treasury, Henry 
Morgenthau had the advantages of more detailed knowledge of financial 
matters and closer personal ties to the President as his neighbor along the 
Hudson River. The State Department, with its traditional dominance in 
foreign affairs, probably should have been considered the favorite in 
betting on how this competition might come out, and the topic seemed a 
natural fit for Adolf Berle to have a major role within the Department. 
Schwarz described Berle as “probably the highest ranking official in 
Washington conversant with Keynes’ ideas in 1938.”88 Berle’s proposals 
for the government’s response to the economic crisis of the late 1930s 
were influenced by and consistent with the stimulus favored by Keynes in 
times of economic weakness.89 Berle repeatedly wrote about the need for 
capital and new ways government might provide it.90 
Like Keynes, Berle was a public intellectual of the day, comfortable 
in writing and speaking about a variety of topics. This period also showed 
Berle’s ability to present a broader message of America’s changing role in 
the world economy, a topic on which Berle was optimistic. In a Fortune 
magazine piece before Pearl Harbor, he forecast that the United States 
would emerge from the war as the richest country and with an altruistic 
policy, because—in the natural order of things—any economics is moral.91 
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In a speech before the Yale Political Union the previous year, he 
presciently observed that it may seem  
fantastic today to suggest handing over some of our accumulated gold 
as a free gift to re-establish international currency, to let other nations 
set their house in order, and thereby reestablish trade and normal life. 
But this may not seem so fantastic a few years hence. It seems 
impossible today to think of using the enormous resources of the 
Federal Reserve System as a means of rebuilding the shattered life of 
another continent, but when the time actually comes . . . we may find 
the idea looks more like an immediate necessity than a fairy tale.92 
The actual outcome, in which Treasury, not State, ended up with the major 
role and Berle was eclipsed, not just in dealings with the British, but also 
within State, is a revealing part of the Berle story. 
4. The Evolution of Post-War Planning in Three Acts: During American 
Neutrality; the Rumble Along Pennsylvania Avenue; 
and Treasury Triumphant 
a. During American Neutrality Before Pearl Harbor 
Planning for the post-war period began almost as soon as Germany 
invaded Poland in 1939. Two weeks later, Hull appointed Leon Pavolsky 
as special assistant to work on the problems of peace.93 By the end of the 
year, Hull had appointed a ten-member committee on the Problems of 
Peace and Reconstruction that included most of the senior officers on duty, 
including Pavolsky and Berle.94 In another two weeks, the title morphed 
into the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations to work 
through three subcommittees: politics, armaments (soon folded into 
politics), and economics. Berle served on the economics subcommittee, 
which was the first to organize, and focused on a conference of neutrals.95 
In May, after large German gains across western and northern 
Europe, a new interdepartmental committee was created—the 
Interdepartmental Group to Consider Post-War International Economic 
Problems and Policies. The State Department numerically dominated this 
group, but its membership went outside the State Department to bring in 
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officials from Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture.96 This group 
included Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and his Chief Advisor on 
Monetary Policy Harry Dexter White, who would play a large role as the 
Bretton Woods process unfolded. The last seven meetings of this group in 
the last quarter of 1940 were devoted wholly to post-war preparations.97 
During this period, Berle worked with Harry Dexter White on an 
inter-American bank to finance development in Latin America, in part as 
a means to withstand totalitarianism in the western hemisphere. As Berle 
biographer Jordan Schwarz described it, Berle’s idea was based on “little 
more than a casual conversation” with Jesse Jones at the RFC and faced 
resistance from Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, but White’s “first-class 
missionary work” at Treasury and Jones’s efforts with bankers got the 
backing of the President.98 Congressional resistance to funding and the 
failure of several countries to subscribe their shares eventually put this 
proposal on the shelf. Nevertheless, White and his Treasury team, in the 
first half of 1942, developed a Stabilization Fund and Development Bank 
proposal for a global response which, along with Keynes’s proposal for a 
clearing union, became the fulcrum of discussion from that time through 
the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, as discussed in the next section.99 
Anglo-American discussions in the period prior to Pearl Harbor 
about Lend-Lease, the American provision of key armaments and supplies 
to the United Kingdom and other countries without immediate payment, 
raised the curtain on what would be the most contested issues of post-war 
economic planning. In preparing for talks to be held in Washington during 
the summer of 1941, the State Department was attuned to Hull’s interest 
in trade and the rising tide of American dominance in international 
exchange; they wanted to see trade free of discrimination in favor of 
British colonies as part of the tradeoff for Lend-Lease. Keynes, making 
his first trip to Washington on behalf of the Treasury, pushed back on such 
ideas arguing that the post-war recovery of the U.K.’s economy sufficient 
to repay the loans taken out to fund the heavy costs of fighting Germany 
would require discrimination in favor of future trade between London and 
its colonies. This issue became a key topic of discussion at the Atlantic 
Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt in Newfoundland in August 
1941. Welles, in reaction to Keynes’s earlier statements in Washington, 
pushed for a strong prohibition of discrimination in trade. Churchill 
balked. Roosevelt suggested language papering over the divergent views 
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with the precise meaning to be worked out in later discussions, which 
would extend well past the end of the war.100 
b. After Pearl Harbor 
In 1942 with America now at war, interdepartmental planning for 
post-war efforts stepped up again and became more detailed. An Advisory 
Committee of officials at State and other Departments and members of 
Congress was formed and organized into six subcommittees that met 
weekly. Berle was active in the economic subcommittees of this group, 
chairing sixteen meetings in the first half of 1942 with Dean Acheson, at 
this point also an Assistant Secretary of State, chairing other meetings.101 
Monetary and banking strategizing was typically a concurrent 
activity under the leadership of Treasury. Here is where the most important 
preparatory work for Bretton Woods actually occurred. Keynes, after the 
Lend-Lease brouhaha, had begun drafting a new plan for monetary policy 
based on a sophisticated concept of a “Clearing Union” which would 
permit countries to trade “bancor” units. This new currency unit, as an 
alternative to gold, would provide more flexibility than a gold standard to 
debtor nations (as the United Kingdom had become, with the necessity of 
war borrowings). After Pearl Harbor, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau put 
White in charge of Treasury’s foreign relations and asked him to “provide 
[a] basis for [a] postwar international monetary arrangement.”102 White 
proceeded to develop his own stabilization and development plan more 
reflective of the United States position as a creditor nation and the rising 
hegemon in international financial affairs. The Keynes and White plans 
formed the basis for U.S.–U.K. discussions culminating with the 
agreements at Bretton Woods. 
In July 1942, one of the interdepartmental planning committees—
this one chaired by White—decided on bilateral discussions of 
memoranda (i.e., the Keynes and White proposals) with the British as the 
way forward; these conversations occurred in September. While Berle had 
pushed for discussion of the White plan at the July meeting, in between 
that meeting and the bilateral discussions, he promoted his own proposal 
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for a United Nations Bank for economic reconstruction.103 When Keynes 
came to Washington to discuss these plans in September of 1942, the first 
meeting was in Berle’s office104 and Berle continued to be the point person 
at State in the months that followed. Assistant Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson had told the British representative that financial matters were 
under Berle.105 The American questions to the U.K. about the Keynes plan 
went through Berle in October and came back to Berle in November.106 In 
between, Berle gave a major speech on foreign policy on October 15.107 In 
late 1942, it seemed to the British and the Canadians that Berle was calling 
the shots “for the financial aspects of post-war planning.”108 
c. Treasury Triumphant 
Behind the scenes things were shifting. In October, Morgenthau and 
White went to England ostensibly to discuss finances for the invasion of 
North Africa. But the Americans arranged for White and Keynes to meet 
for a long substantive session of the two monetary plans.109 After the State 
Department’s formal notification in November that it was ready to proceed 
with talks on monetary policy between the U.S. and U.K. governments, 
the White and Keynes plans picked up their earlier discussions. In the first 
part of 1943 as differences still remained, Berle agreed to continue 
bilateral conversations but did not want it to appear as if other nations were 
being presented with a fait accompli. Thus, Berle initiated discussions with 
the Chinese.110 Over the next two months the U.S. and U.K. camps 
bickered back and forth as to whether the two competing plans would be 
published and if so, by whom, leading to eventual leaks and publications 
of both. As the plans had become more detailed and more public, the role 
of Treasury had become more entrenched. By early spring, clarity came in 
the form of an official U.S. announcement that Treasury “though 
consulting with others, would be expected to ‘carry the ball.’”111 In the 
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future, the British would go to Morgenthau, not Berle.112 When Keynes 
again visited Washington in September of 1943, Berle sat in on the 
meeting but deferred to Treasury leadership.113 When the two countries 
and allied nations met the following July in Bretton Woods for the 
conferences proposing the IMF and the World Bank, Berle did not attend. 
The State Department retained the lead role in negotiations for trade 
(labeled by the two sides as “commercial”), but Berle was not a leading 
figure in that either. The September 1943 meetings involved a combined 
British delegation that came to Washington for both trade and monetary 
discussions. Berle was involved but not like the previous year. The White–
Keynes talks continued at long-distance through the fall, winter, and 
spring, at Atlantic City in the week before the beginning of the Bretton 
Woods conference and then for most of the month of July at Bretton 
Woods. 
When the President called on Congress to pass the Bretton Woods 
proposals for the IMF and the World Bank, he noted his expectation that 
proposals for the reduction of trade barriers and other matters “will shortly 
be ready to submit to you for your consideration” as part of the United 
States taking the lead in “establishing the principle of economic 
cooperation as the foundation for expanded world trade.”114 Yet, the trade 
part had not made nearly as much progress as the monetary portion. While 
the monetary issues had been assigned to Treasury in the spring of 1943, 
trade remained under the State Department, with a delegation led by 
Myron Taylor, Harry Hawkins, and Dean Acheson—not Berle. Those 
talks got no further than broad agreement on the importance of trade to 
expand employment and to identify the issues of quantitative restrictions 
and trade preferences but put off the next steps until the beginning of 1945. 
In December of 1945 the United States invited the wartime allies to enter 
into negotiations for a multilateral agreement on trade in goods with 
related talks in London and Geneva leading to a charter of an International 
Trade Organization approved in Havana in March 1948.115 
d. Denouement 
As these broader international economic issues moved away from 
Berle during the war, one area remained, that of a proposed international 
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civil aviation treaty with the conference to be held in November of 1944 
in Chicago. Differences between the U.S. and the U.K. over rights to fly 
the Atlantic held up a final agreement, although eventually there was a 
treaty and an international civil aeronautics association that reflected 
Berle’s work. During the conference held shortly after Roosevelt’s 
reelection, White House advisor Harry Hopkins flew out to Chicago to tell 
Berle there was not a place for him in the fourth term.116 Sumner Welles 
left as Undersecretary the previous year and Hull was retiring at the end 
of the month. The new Secretary would bring his own people. 
The position offered to Berle was Ambassador to Brazil, which he 
did for thirteen months with mixed results.117 He negotiated to be able to 
attend a conference in Mexico City in early 1945 and to make a personal 
report to the President. But by April, the President was dead and Berle 
soon headed back to New York and Columbia. 
C. Responsibility Outside of Economic Planning 
While Berle had his largest continuing impact on various matters 
relating to economics, there were other topics of recurring responsibility. 
Latin America, a life-long interest discussed elsewhere in this Article, was 
one, intelligence was another. Berle’s government service first intersected 
with intelligence in World War I during his time in the Dominican 
Republic. After completing his work relating to land titles affecting sugar, 
he extended his stay at the request of the governor and the chief of military 
intelligence to feel the pulse of the countryside.118 When the State 
Department set up an intelligence division in late 1940, Roosevelt soon 
asked that Berle coordinate overlap with the FBI and its director, J. Edgar 
Hoover. 119 The FBI already operated outside of the U.S. in Latin America 
and, in consultation with Berle and military intelligence, decided to create 
a Special Intelligence Service to operate in South America. When the U.S. 
later decided to set up a separate secret intelligence agency the President 
first followed his “competition between agencies” approach with Berle 
negotiating for the FBI to have the western hemisphere and military 
intelligence with responsibility for the rest of the world. As William 
Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services grew, Berle’s role diminished. 
Berle’s role in the State Department intelligence led to his 
involvement in two other intelligence matters that subsequently gained 
political prominence: Whittaker Chambers’ 1939 charges that Alger Hiss 
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was a communist agent, leading to two trials and Hiss’s conviction of 
perjury in 1950; and similar charges against the Treasury’s Harry Dexter 
White that led to Berle’s statement to another Congressional committee 
later in the 1950s. In 1939, Chambers had gone to the White House to 
expose Alger Hiss, then a State Department employee, as a communist.120 
Marvin MacIntyre, the President’s secretary, told Chambers to take it to 
Berle in the State Department overseeing intelligence. The day after 
Germany invaded Poland, Chambers revealed his charges to Berle, who 
took notes and reported it to the President. FDR showed little interest in 
the report, nor did others seem interested in pushing it along. Germany 
was the focus—the Soviet Union had by that time signed a non-aggression 
treaty with Germany, eventually becoming an American ally after 
Germany’s invasion the following year. Eighteen months after the 
Chambers visit, Berle went to the FBI in March 1941 and asked what it 
knew of Chambers. Fourteen months went by before the FBI interviewed 
Chambers and an additional thirteen more months went by before the 
Bureau requested Berle’s memo of 1939. More time passed until the State 
Department’s security office questioned Chambers in March 1945. 
Elizabeth Bentley, another self-confessed Communist spy, went to the FBI 
with her own allegations about Hiss in 1945, but there was still little 
immediate movement.121 
Once the 1946 elections switched control of the House of 
Representatives, and in the face of rising tensions between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the activity relating to the old accusations 
picked up. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) held 
hearings in 1948 including Chambers’s charges against Hiss, who had 
risen in the State Department in the nine years since Chambers–Berle 
meeting, eventually serving as a presidential advisor at Yalta and helping 
set up the United Nations.122 Hiss’s strong defense to the charges and his 
libel suit against Chambers provoked Chambers to produce additional 
evidence and that provided part of the basis for perjury charges against 
Hiss. When called to testify before the HUAC committee, Berle 
downplayed the importance of Russian surveillance as an existential threat 
and took a swipe at Dean Acheson, then undersecretary, for the 
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Department’s failure to pursue Berle’s preferred hard line toward the 
Russians.123 
A second parallel thread of Congressional hearings into alleged 
communist spying involved charges made against Harry Dexter White.124 
White had been nominated by President Truman in January, 1946, to be 
the American executive director of the IMF, with the expectation that the 
United States would back him for managing director, the top position of 
the new entity.125 However, White’s name had surfaced in allegations by 
Elizabeth Bentley who had named White as part of a group in Treasury 
and other departments who were funneling information to Russia.126 In late 
1945, J. Edgar Hoover had informed the White House’s FBI liaison, with 
copies to the Secretary of State and Attorney General, warning of the 
danger of appointing White to the IMF, but that information did not seem 
to have any effect before White’s nomination was announced. Hoover then 
prepared a special report for the President that set off alarm bells at the 
White House; yet even here the keystone cops caper continued as the 
White House’s call to the Senate to stop the vote on the nomination came 
too late.127 To avoid signaling American knowledge of the spy ring, the 
Administration chose to not seek White’s resignation or removal. 
However, the Administration did choose not to put White’s name forward 
for the top IMF job, saying it would support an American instead for the 
top job at the World Bank.128 
Even so, White only stayed one month past the March 1, 1947 
official opening of the IMF doors. He was interviewed by the FBI in 
August 1947, had a severe heart attack soon after, and testified before a 
grand jury March 24 and 25, 1948, but was not indicted. After Chambers 
and Bentley both testified before HUAC that summer against White, 
White himself testified on August 13, gaining positive reports in the 
press.129 On the train to his summer home in New Hampshire the next day 
he suffered a second severe heart attack and died the following day. 
Congressional attacks on White continued posthumously with Richard 
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Nixon revealing in 1950 that he had documents hand-written by White that 
had been turned over by Chambers, from the same hidden cache of 
“Pumpkin Papers” that had surfaced during the Hiss investigation. In 1951 
both Bentley and Chambers testified against the deceased White before a 
Senate committee.130 Two years later, counsel for another Senate 
committee called on Berle looking for testimony on whether Harry Dexter 
White was a Russian spy. Berle replied that he had no knowledge of the 
now deceased White and did not much care. “There were Soviet spies and 
there was Communist infiltration. Taken together, it made a little trouble 
and probably did not vary greatly the course of affairs. . . . But directing 
the whole course of American politics in 1954 to examination of the 
mistakes of 1944 gets us absolutely nowhere.”131 
III. POST-WAR RETURN TO NEW YORK CITY AS A PUBLIC 
INTELLECTUAL, PROFESSOR, AND POLITICIAN 
After a rocky thirteen months in Brazil, Berle returned to New York 
to teach, practice law, participate in state and national politics, and 
contribute to the public discussion of ideas. With Truman now President, 
Berle no longer enjoyed the access to the White House that he had for 
twelve years. The Liberal Party of New York became his platform for 
political involvement when he became chair in early 1947. The party 
enjoyed some success in pursuing a balance-of-power strategy; for 
example, it helped Herbert Lehman beat John Foster Dulles in the Senate 
race in 1949. Berle retained some personal influence, serving as part of 
Stevenson’s brain trust in 1952 and 1956 and interacting with the 
Eisenhower Administration via Nelson Rockefeller (then a top official at 
State), Allen Dulles at the CIA, and others. He joined a group with roots 
back to the Versailles peace conference to help found Radio Free Europe 
and volunteered more than half of his time to that cause in the early 1950s. 
In some ways the pattern parallels his political involvement in New York 
between 1933 and 1937—with one difference: The third party balance of 
power strategy did not provide any significant key policy-making 
influence once the election was over in contrast to what had happened in 
the LaGuardia Administrations. 
Latin America provided a continuing, if still sporadic, entre to 
policy-making in an area Berle cared about. In the early part of the 
Eisenhower Administration, he journeyed to Costa Rica for discussions 
with its President and was involved in addressing its conflict with 
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Nicaragua, its larger neighbor. At the later request of the CIA he helped 
the elected President of Honduras deal with a military coup. Later in the 
decade, he continued to be involved as Latin America responded to the 
Cuban revolution. More generally, he collaborated with Henry Kissinger 
in a years-long task of a Rockefeller Fund report chaired by Dean Rusk, 
putting him in the orbit of two future Secretaries of State.132 When John 
Kennedy was elected President in 1960, Berle wanted in. He was asked to 
chair a transition task force on Latin America, leading to a position as chair 
of an interdepartmental task force on Latin America with an office in the 
State Department near Rusk (who had said that all roads in Latin American 
affairs led to Berle).133 This was a task an intellectual jobber could 
appreciate, and he signed on for six months. Unfortunately for Berle, the 
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, a CIA operation, dominated the history of 
those six months that some in Latin America saw as unilateral 
intervention, and one which the anti-Castro Cubans saw as Americans 
leaving them on the beaches. With the failure of the mission and the 
Administration’s Latin American policy in some disarray, Berle returned 
to New York. 
Berle had at least one more role on the national political stage. When 
Lyndon Johnson became President after John Kennedy’s assassination, 
New Dealers like Abe Fortas and Jim Rowe were close to the new 
President and reached out to Berle to provide an FDR connection for 
LBJ.134 Berle became involved in the Dominican Republic, where his 
interest in foreign policy had been sparked a half century before. Berle 
sought to walk the line between differing factions, but in late April 1965 
Johnson ordered a United States invasion, which Berle, the long-ago 
advocate of Dominican self-determination, justified to prevent a Castro-
mounted takeover. The following month, Johnson invited Berle to lunch 
at the White House.135 The President also wanted to discuss an even bigger 
topic, Vietnam, and here too, Berle seemed willing to have the United 
States fight to keep freed colonial people free from communism. 
Against this pattern of somewhat humbling results in politics and 
diplomacy over the second-half of his career, Berle found a continuing 
outlet in his academic and policy writing. Upon rejoining Columbia, he 
returned to law review writing (which he had abandoned, except for a 
couple of exceptions after 1934) and authored a dozen books. Even more, 
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his biographer Schwarz noted, “Perhaps nothing else during these troubled 
times gave Berle more satisfaction than his chairmanship of the Board of 
Trustees of the Twentieth Century Fund. He saw in the Fund his last great 
quest to be a powerful brain truster—a ‘causative’ intellectual making 
history.”136 That public policy think tank permitted him to explore, and 
support others in exploring, a variety of issues across a broad range of 
topics. 
Berle’s most lasting impact in the post-1932 period was his own 
academic writings. His post-1946 law review articles took some of his 
earlier topics and developed them in light of developments since 1932. His 
1952 Pennsylvania Law Review article, Constitutional Limitations on 
Corporate Activity, may be the most creative of this group. Anticipating 
the constitutional debate of the early twenty-first century on constitutional 
rights of corporations, Berle started from the then-current picture of 
corporate law: “classic corporation law is almost never availed of to adjust 
the relations between the corporate enterprise and the community.”137 For 
the 1932 Berle, this was a no-brainer: corporations have economic and 
political obligations and privileges and are expected to produce an 
economic result acceptable to the community. The 1952 article saw the 
challenges in extending individual rights, but not in the way that 
contemporary cases like Citizens United138 and Hobby Lobby139 have 
developed. Berle’s focus was more on corporations being subject to the 
constitutional limitations which limit the state itself because of the power 
that has accrued to those entities.140 
Elsewhere, Berle dealt with a disconnect between corporate theory—
the sovereign’s grant of certain attributes of personality to a corporate 
group—and the underlying economic reality of an enterprise operating via 
multiple entities within an enterprise.141 Berle put forward a revision of the 
classic conception, arguing for enterprise liability. A principal focus was 
the then-recent liability-creating Supreme Court case Anderson v. Abbott, 
written by his former Columbia colleague and fellow-New Deal 
progressive, William O. Douglas.142 In another article, he took on the 
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question of corporate control, as in the then-recent case of Perlman v. 
Feldmann, written by another strong New Dealer on the Second Circuit, 
Charles Clark.143 A core foundation of this article, common to his other 
writing, was the community’s “vivid interest in the policies and operations 
of the corporation.”144 
In Berle’s last article, he returned to a theme of The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property to emphasize the change in the nature 
of property resulting from the rise of the corporation.145 Unlike his first 
employer, Brandeis, he had long before cast his lot with accepting the large 
corporation and using government to match it. In the Constitutional piece 
discussed above, Berle outlined the direction law should follow “to assure 
that the market power of the enterprise shall not be used so as to create or 
perpetuate conditions that the state itself is forbidden to create or 
maintain.”146 In Property, Production and Revolution, he suggested the 
need for a new role for shareholders with a different kind of governance 
role reflecting a more transitory ownership of stock in large corporations 
that was essentially more liquid than comparable interests in earlier 
businesses. Shareholders in this view act less as an allocator of capital and 
more as a “vehicle for rationalized wealth distribution corresponding to 
and serving the American ideal of a just civilization.”147 In these ideas, 
Berle came closest to a reprise of the ideas of his intellectual trifecta of 
1932. 
CONCLUSION 
Eighty-five years after his most notable intellectual contributions, 
Adolf Berle’s impact still can be characterized as distinctive. His public 
renown has been surpassed by few law professors before or since. What 
explains his lasting recognition? Ideas, like people, come in a multitude of 
variations. In one sense, his recognition reflects a particular idea at a 
                                                     
that Congress had not “announced a legislative policy such as the Court announces.” Id. at 374. Berle 
was sympathetic to some broadened liability across entity boundaries but would permit a corporate 
group to preserve separateness if the parent required the subsidiary to “manage its own affairs, make 
its own decisions, and operate as a separate entity.” Berle, Enterprise Liability, supra note 141, at 357. 
 143. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (controlling shareholder breached 
fiduciary duty by siphoning off for personal gain corporate advantages to be derived from a favorable 
market situation due to quasi-price controls during the Korean War, but not saying that a majority 
shareholder can never dispose of controlling block for a premium). 
 144. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM L. REV. 1212, 1215 (1958). 
Berle argued that Perlman went far in the direction of his position in MCPP—that control belongs to 
the corporation, not the shareholders who can deliver control, and that those who run corporations are 
stewards for employees, customers, suppliers, and the community affected by their operations. Id. at 
1212, 1221. 
 145. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1965). 
 146. Id. at 10. 
 147. Id. at 17. 
2019] Adolf Berle During the New Deal 695 
particular time. There was a new kind of a corporation in a changed 
economic setting that required a different government response. How 
many professorial efforts could be fit into such a template? The difference 
was the timing. The severity of the Great Depression and then the world 
war that accelerated the coming of an American hegemon in global 
economics enhanced and deepened the questions he addressed and 
magnified the usefulness of the framework he identified. In the absence of 
those factors it is not surprising that he could not replicate the impact of 
his 1932 ideas as part of the Roosevelt Administration over the next twelve 
years or as a public intellectual in the quarter-century that followed. The 
match in those times of ideas and current political trends were more 
ordinary. Yet a deeper understanding of both what fit so well in the early 
1930s and less so afterwards can productively inform our analysis of 
current challenges. Berle demonstrated that a law professor skilled in the 
nuances of corporate law could simultaneously be a force in broader policy 
matters with an effect lasting generations. 
